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RESEARCH NOTE 
STUDYING POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN AFRICA 
PRITISH BEHURIA, LARS BUUR AND HAZEL GRAY 
 
ABSTRACT 
The political settlements approach emerged out of a critique of new institutional economics 
developed by Mushtaq Khan in the 1990s. Since then, the political settlements approach has 
proliferated in donor programming and academic scholarship on African countries. This has led to 
some confusion about its core conceptual and methodological features. This Research Note starts by 
setting out our understanding of political settlements and provides an overview of existing political 
settlements literature on African countries. The note then explores how the key concept of ‘holding 
power’ has been employed in varied ways in the political settlements literature, which in turn has led 
to various methodologies to study power. The note discusses a number of these methodologies, 
including studying political ruptures as a window into analyzing the distribution of power in African 
countries, and emphasizes the importance of studying economic structure, ideology, violence rights 
and rents as sources of holding power. The overall contribution of the note is to illustrate the varied 
strategies used in studying political settlements and to place them in conversation with one another.  
 
THE TERM POLITICAL SETTLEMENT now appears regularly in scholarship on African 
countries. It is often used in an intuitive sense to refer to the prevailing political order or to specific 
peace agreements that emerge at the end of war. A political settlements approach, however, also has 
a much more specific meaning as a discreet political economy analytical framework that provides a 
novel way of understanding the drivers and outcomes of contemporary socioeconomic change.  In 
this more rigorous usage of the term, a political settlement refers to ‘a combination of power and 
institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political 
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viability.’1 As a distinct analytical approach, political settlements analysis emerged out of Mushtaq 
Khan’s work in the mid-1990s.2  
Khan’s work has its roots in a critique of new institutional economics (NIE) and the prevailing good 
governance agenda. Since that time, the political settlements approach has become entangled with a 
wider range of donor-driven research agendas that have sought to render legible the politics of 
development and, in particular, the way that governance and institutions work in weak, fragile and 
conflict-afflicted settings.3 As political economy concerns emerged as a leading preoccupation in 
international development assistance organizations, how to work ‘with the grain’4 in developing 
countries and better understand the organization of the local politics and economy became a major 
prerequisite during programming.  
This led to the establishment of a number of donor-funded research centres that sought to define and 
operationalize a political settlements approach within international development. A broad field of 
studies emerged, which drew on some of the insights of the original political settlements 
framework, leading to the development of analytical tool kits and an extensive grey literature on 
political settlements. James Putzel and Jonathan Di John at The Crisis States Research Centre wrote 
two influential reports on political settlements and Adrian Leftwich’s work as Director of Research 
of the Developmental Leadership Program contributed to popularizing the term.5 Other large 
research centres that have employed the concept include the Effective States and Inclusive 
Development (ESID) Research Centre and the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP). 
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2010), p. 4. 
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5 Jonathan Di John and James Putzel, ‘Political settlements: Issues paper’ (Governance and Social Development 
Resource Centre, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, 2009); James Putzel and Jonathan Di John, ‘Meeting the 
challenges of Crisis States’ (Crisis States Research Centre Report, London, 2012); Edward Laws and Adrian Leftwich, 
‘Political settlements’, (Development Leadership Programme Concept Brief 01, Birmingham, 2014); David Hudson and 
Adrian Leftwich, ‘From political economy to political analysis’, (Development Leadership Programme Research Paper 
25, Birmingham, 2014). 
The political settlements approach has also been used by African research centres, for example the 
Partnership for African Social and Governance Research in Nairobi and the Hierarchies of Rights: 
Land and Investments in Africa at University of Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo. The term political 
settlement even featured in the most recent World Development Report of the World Bank.6 
However, in the World Bank report it is used interchangeably with the institutional theories of 
Douglass North and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson.7  
The proliferation of research using the term political settlement has generated significant new 
insights into contemporary political and economic processes in Africa. However, it has also led to 
some confusion about the core analytical and methodological features of a political settlements 
approach. In some work, these different approaches have been seen as complementary,8 while 
others have sought to maintain its analytical and critical distinctiveness.9 Yet still others ask with 
bemusement: ‘What on earth is a “Political Settlement”?’ protesting that it makes limited original 
contributions and that it is riddled with conceptual mutations.10 We argue that this claim is not 
warranted. There is a need, however, to return to the original theoretical moorings of the concept to 
avoid overloading and distorting the framework. Clarifying the solid theoretical foundations of a 
political settlements approach provides a stronger basis on which to expand the scope of the 
framework to engage with new analytical and empirical insights that emerge from this burgeoning 
research field.  
The purpose of this research note is to set out our understanding of the theoretical foundations of 
political settlements, to highlight its distinctive analytical features and explain the uses of the 
framework for research on African countries. The note starts with an overview of the approach and 
its main conceptual building blocks. The note traces some of the important differences in the way 
that the concept of political settlements has been used, highlighting key differences in 
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drivers of capitalist transformation’ (LSE International Development Working paper Series No. 14-159, London, 2014); 
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Reyntjens (eds), Aid and authoritarianism in Africa: Development without democracy (Zed Books, London, 2016), pp. 
139-160. 
understandings of power, actors and economic processes. The note sets out the concept of holding 
power in more detail and makes the argument for studying economic structure, violence rights, 
ideology and rents as sources of holding power. It then explores how political ruptures offer one 
way of examining the distribution of power and highlights some of the different research strategies 
that have been used to understand the evolution of political settlements in African countries. It ends 
by explaining how the political settlements approach departs form dominant framings of Africa’s 
political economy. 
 
 
What is a political settlement? 
Khan developed the political settlements approach as a way to understand the patterns and evolution 
of the distribution of power in particular societies; in other words, sets of institutions and power 
relations are seen as constellations that characterize the social order in a particular country in the 
global economy.11  The idea that power and institutions are distinct and often not in alignment is a 
perspective that is widely shared across social sciences. This misalignment between the formal 
institutions of the state and the ways that powerful groups organize to make claims on the state is a 
significant driver of clientelism in low-income countries. The implications of this observation for 
economic and social change are explained by the political settlements approach in ways that are 
quite different from other institutional approaches. The starting point for a political settlements 
analysis is the observation that capitalism has shaped institutions and the distribution of power in 
societies across the world over centuries.12 Nevertheless, the impact of capitalism on institutions 
and power in low-income countries has a number of distinct features shaped by colonialism and the 
limited productive transformations that unfolded since the end of the colonial era.13 In OECD 
countries that were in the first wave of industrialization and economic transformation, institutions 
have been molded to reflect the economic power of capitalist groups.  
In contemporary low-income countries, formal political institutions were often inherited from the 
colonial state. The existing capitalist economy in these countries produces a relatively low surplus, 
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69-80. 
13 Khan, ‘Political settlements’. 
constrained by the lack of a transformation in the productive capacities of the economy.14 These 
structural characteristics provide an explanation for the prevalence of clientelism in low-income 
countries without making clientelism axiomatic within the study of the political economy of 
development. Indeed, a political settlements approach allows for the study of other forms of non-
clientelist politics informed by ideas, political commitments and ideologies, while providing a 
context to the difficulties of generating and sustaining programmatic politics in developing 
countries.15 
Political settlements are studied with an assumption that power is rooted in history. Khan proposes 
three dimensions as the object of study: the horizontal distribution of power, the vertical distribution 
of power, and how a political settlement is financed.16 The horizontal distribution of power refers to 
the ‘power of excluded factions, relative to the ruling coalition.’17 He argues that if excluded 
coalitions are weak, the ruling coalition is likely to act in line with a longer time horizon while if 
excluded coalitions are strong, the ruling coalition may act to secure its short-term survival or may 
not survive in the long-run. Any study of the horizontal distribution of power should begin with a 
historical analysis of the evolution of ruling coalitions and those who have opposed them including 
both elite and non-elite groups. The distribution of power evolves constantly within a political 
settlement. An important distinction between new institutional economic approaches and political 
settlements is that the latter recognizes that where power is disbursed outside formal institutions, 
this does not necessarily drive changes in the formal institutional structure. Thus a political 
settlements approach can involve tracing the changing distribution of power between different 
groups over time, as reflected in struggles over property or rents. This means that changes in the 
distribution of power are not necessarily aligned to formal regime change.  
The political settlements approach can also involve studying moments of intense change where 
‘political ruptures’ have structured new divisions of power. ‘Political ruptures’ are similar to 
‘critical junctures’, which are ‘relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially 
heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest.’18 In comparison, 
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and economic development: Theory and evidence from Asia’ (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), pp 70 – 
144. 
15 On this point, see Hazel Gray, Turbulence and order in economic development: The political settlement and 
economic transformation in Tanzania and Vietnam (Oxford University Press, Oxford, forthcoming)  
16 Khan, ‘Political settlements’. 
17 Ibid, pp. 64-65. 
18 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, ‘The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in 
historical institutionalism’, World Politics 59, 3 (2007), pp. 341-369. 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s influential work uses a much looser definition of a critical juncture as ‘a 
major event or confluence of factors, which disrupts the existing balance of political and economic 
power in a nation.’19 However, when studying critical junctures as part of a political settlements 
approach, we stress the importance of analyzing ‘political ruptures’ – the political outcomes that 
occur during such periods. In this way, we stress that decisions made during such periods can lead 
to changes in the distribution of power among different groups within society, although they may 
not result in formal regime change or institutional change.20  
The second dimension of power in political settlements theory is the vertical distribution of power, 
which refers to ‘the relative power of higher compared to lower factions within the ruling 
coalition’.21 Khan argues that the greater the relative power of higher factions over lower factions, 
the stronger the coalition’s implementation and enforcement capacities. When analyzing the 
evolution of the vertical distribution of power, it is important to engage with the concept of 
legitimacy. However, it is difficult to calculate whether certain political regimes have been more 
popular or legitimate across history than others. Instead, in line with our focus on ‘political 
ruptures’, a good starting point is to understand legitimacy defined as ‘the probability that other 
authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority’.22 Using this definition helps us to 
understand regime legitimacy on the basis of whether authority has been contested (rather than if 
the population was obedient). Thus, the task of ascertaining whether the ruling coalition’s relative 
holding power has been threatened depends on whether elite or non-elite groups forced a rupture in 
the distribution of power. Such ruptures help us identify which groups are the spoilers in political 
settlements. The fall-out from ruptures enables us to identify how political decisions were made to 
exclude or integrate groups into existing hierarchies of power.  
The third dimension of power in political settlements theory refers to how political settlements have 
been and are financed. To study this, it is helpful to determine the relationship between the ruling 
coalitions and economic actors. These actors could be capitalists, but there are many economic 
actors that are not necessarily capitalist as they don´t solely depend on the market for their 
reproduction. These actors could be identified by analyzing the ownership structure within 
                                                          
19 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations fail, p. 106.  
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434-451. 
21 Khan, ‘Political settlements’, p. 65. 
22 Charles Tilly, ‘War making and state making as organised crime’, in Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Peter Evans and Theda 
Skocpol (eds), Bringing the state back in (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), pp. 169-187, p. 171. 
particular sectors, but frequently groups with the most economic power will straddle multiple 
sectors. As such, examining the histories of particular firms and business groups is also critical. 
Insights into the relationship with key economic actors can also emerge from an examination of 
how those who work in financial institutions (especially when they were primarily state-owned or 
when states predominantly control access to economic opportunities) engage with the ruling 
coalition. In Rwanda, political ruptures within the dominant coalition were clear in the 2000s when 
two prominent Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) figures were fired from their positions leading 
locally-owned banks on charges of corruption. One left in exile and the other was jailed for several 
years. This sparked a rapid liberalization of banks, which occurred as a result of political ruptures 
within the dominant coalition.23 This illustrates that it is useful to study how the relationships 
between the ruling coalitions and different economic actors and capitalists evolve. When ruptures 
occur, they may be signals that the prevailing distribution of power in political settlements is being 
threatened or consolidated.  
 
Methodologies for how to ‘do’ political settlements research  
Research that uses the political settlements framework has examined many topics in varied 
contexts. New topics of study include (but are not limited to) public service provision, education, 
social transfers and urban transitions.24 The African countries that have been studied include (but 
are not limited to) Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique and Ghana.25 In African Affairs, five 
                                                          
23 Pritish Behuria and Tom Goodfellow, ‘The political settlement and “deals environment” in Rwanda: Unpacking two 
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24 Marja Hirvi and Lindsay Whitfield, ‘Public‐Service provision in clientelist political settlements: Lessons from 
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Lavers and Sam Hickey, ‘Conceptualising the politics of social protection expansion in low-income countries: The 
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Rwanda: A different political economy?’ Development Policy Review 32, s2 (2014), pp. s173-s196. For Uganda, recent 
literature includes Anne Mette Kjaer, ‘Political settlements and productive sector policies: Understanding sector 
differences in Uganda’, World Development 68 (2015), pp. 230-241. For Tanzania, see Hazel Gray, ‘Industrial policy 
and the political settlement in Tanzania: Aspects of continuity and change since independence’, Review of African 
Political Economy 40, 136 (2013), pp. 185-201. For Mozambique, see Lars Buur, Carlota Mondlane Tembe, and Obede 
Baloi, ‘The white gold: The role of government and state in rehabilitating the sugar industry in Mozambique’, Journal 
of Development Studies 48, 3 (2012), pp. 349-362. For Ghana, see Lindsay Whitfield and Lars Buur, ‘The politics of 
industrial policy: Ruling elites and their alliances’, Third World Quarterly 35, 1 (2014), pp. 126-144. 
recent articles have employed this approach using varied methodologies to study the politics behind 
policy reforms and associated rent distribution in Angola, Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania.26 This 
research note engages the insights from existing works to showcase how a broader understanding of 
the composites of holding power can help us develop a clearer understanding of political 
settlements in African countries.  
Holding power has been central to some recent work, which has employed the political settlements 
approach, including Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai and Sam Hickey’s work on the politics behind the 
distribution of resources in Ghana’s education sector and Tom Goodfellow’s work on the politics 
behind the transformation of Kigali.27 Holding power refers to ‘the capability of an individual or 
group to engage and survive in conflicts.’28  Thus, holding power refers to the capacity of groups to 
impose costs on others and also, the capacity to absorb costs inflicted on them. If the concept is 
extended to the realm of governance and institutions, enforcement of certain rules would be 
stronger if ruling groups had more relative holding power than groups in opposition to such rules. 
Conversely, if ruling groups had less relative holding power than the groups that opposed rules, 
enforcement capacity would be weaker.  
Scholarship that has used the concept of ‘holding power’ has employed it in different ways. One 
way has been to analyze how rents have been distributed between different groups or different 
individuals within and outside coalitions.29 Another strategy has been to focus on how elite access 
to influential positions is spread within a government’s political, military and economic hierarchies. 
Abdulai and Hickey, following Stefan Lindemann’s earlier work, use this strategy by examining the 
spatial distribution of holding power of different regions through the distribution of senior 
government positions.30 If quantitative measures are sought to evaluate distributions of power in 
such ways, categories are often delineated on the basis of ethnicity, locational background or 
religion. A weakness of such strategies is that they assume that political mobilization only occurs on 
                                                          
26 Abdulai and Hickey, ’The politics of development’; Sonia Languille, ‘The scramble for textbooks in 
Tanzania’, African Affairs 115, 458 (2016), pp. 73-96; Sam Hickey and Angelo Izama, ‘The politics of governing oil in 
Uganda: Going against the grain?’, African Affairs 116, 463 (2017): 163-185; Sylvia Croese, ‘State-led housing 
delivery as an instrument of developmental patrimonialism: The case of post-war Angola’, African Affairs 116, 462 
(2017), pp. 80-100; Hazel Gray ‘The political economy of grand corruption in Tanzania’, African Affairs 114, 456 
(2015), pp. 382 – 403. 
27 Abdulai and Hickey, ‘The politics of development’; Goodfellow, ‘Rwanda's political settlement’. 
28 Khan, ‘Political settlements’, p. 6. 
29 Douglass North, John Wallis, Steven Webb and Barry Weingast (eds), In the shadow of violence: Politics, economics 
and the problems of development (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013). 
30 Abdulai and Hickey, ‘The politics of development’; Stefan Lindemann, ‘Just another change of guard? Broad-based 
politics and civil war in Museveni’s Uganda’, African Affairs 110, 440 (2011), pp. 387-446. 
the basis of one salient group identity and neglect the possibility that individuals may mobilise 
support within and across groups. To develop a better understanding of political settlements, it is 
important to recognize that power often lies outside formal government positions and may be a 
product of overlapping and historical sources of power.  
A third approach examines holding power through studying the historical evolution of the 
distribution of power in societies and to relate it to outcomes associated with policymaking in 
different sectors. Sylvia Croese’s recent study of the politics behind state-led housing delivery in 
Angola is one example of this.31 Another interesting strategy employed by Sonia Languille is 
exploring the individual trajectory of prominent businessmen who eventually tried their hands in 
politics.32 All these approaches are valuable. However, holding power ‘depends not just on the 
resources the organization can deploy but also on its power to mobilize support’, or more precisely, 
it ‘is partly based on income and wealth but also on historically rooted capacities of different groups 
to organize.’33 Given this, we note that the strategies indicated above fail to take into account 
broader composites of holding power (including ideology or the allocation of violence rights). 
Though the methods that they have used provide interesting analyses related to their topics, a study 
of political settlements in developing countries is generally a macro-level study, which requires an 
analysis of the distribution of holding power and what constitutes such power in societies. In this 
regard sectoral studies cannot necessarily be extrapolated to cover such macro-level analysis. 
However, such studies do point at important aspects of holding power. Importantly, they suggest 
that the wealth of an individual or group contributes to the amount of holding power that they enjoy 
in society. In this regard, Nicos Poulantzas argued that if capitalism is to be sustained in modern 
societies, the state must mediate both inter-class conflicts, as well as conflicts between factions of 
capitalist classes, while also promoting the expansion of capitalism as a whole.34 For rapid capital 
accumulation the state must support capitalists, as argued by Poulantzas. However, he takes it as 
given that the state will reflect the interests of capital. Yet, as Colin Leys argues, in Africa, the state 
cannot simply be assumed to support capitalist accumulation strategies when the state does not see 
                                                          
31 Croese, ‘State-led housing delivery’. 
32 Languille, ‘The scramble for textbooks’. 
33 Khan, ‘Political settlements’, p. 1. 
34 Nicos Poulantzas, Political power and social class (New Left Books, London, 1973).  
its interests as being aligned with particular capitalist groups. This insight is key to the political 
settlements approach.35 
Clearly, the finances that capitalists provide to support politicians can spur conflict. Politicians must 
receive their funds from somewhere and the existing wealth of rivals can be a source of tension for 
ruling elites. However, a given government’s policy decisions have an important impact in terms of 
the distribution of resources in any society and this is even more profound in a developmental 
setting. When studying certain policy decisions such as banning the import of second-hand clothing, 
it can be useful to identify the outcomes that result in terms of the distribution of market share in the 
domestic garments sectors.36 Such processes can be a window into the evolution of power between 
capitalist actors and how successful they are at tapping into other mobilized political groups to 
protect their interests. Outcomes can show how new capitalist winners are ‘picked’, or how the 
same former importers are able to sustain their power by entering and capturing market share in 
garments production. A political settlements approach also involves looking at rents that flow 
outside the formal policy sphere, such as through illicit or corrupt off-budget flows. These can 
provide a critical insight into holding power and into the way that the state may support the 
accumulation strategies of capitalists outside the formal policy arena. This is particularly important 
where the claims of capitalists on the state have limited political legitimacy for historical reasons.37 
Importantly, evaluations of ‘historically rooted capacities of different groups to organize’ must go 
beyond an evaluation of who holds wealth.38  The capacity of an individual or group to mobilize 
support often resides in their historical legitimacy. There is a tendency within economic models of 
conflict to retain assumptions of methodological individualism and rational choice. In the 
economics of conflict literature, such arguments are most closely associated by those, including 
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, who see ‘greed’ as the most significant motivation for individuals 
to engage in conflict.39 Douglass North and his colleagues take this further in their study of limited 
access orders and several others retain similar assumptions.40 An associated assumption is that the 
poor have a comparative advantage in violence and that the unemployed are more likely to be 
mobilized for violence. However, Christopher Cramer shows that such arguments have many 
                                                          
35 Colin Leys, The rise and fall of development theory (James Currey, Oxford, 1996). 
36 Pritish Behuria, ‘The political economy of import substitution in the 21st century: The challenge of recapturing the 
domestic market in Rwanda’ (LSE International Development Working Paper Series No. 17-182, London, 2017). 
37 Gray, ‘The political economy of grand corruption’; Gray, ‘Industrial policy and the political settlement in Tanzania’. 
38 Khan, ‘Political settlements’, p. 1. 
39 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and grievance in civil war (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2001). 
40 North et al., Violence and social orders. 
troubling assumptions.41  Instead, people resort to violence not just for monetary gain or for fear of 
being deprived of assets but also for social, emotional and ideological reasons.42 A political 
settlements approach does not share the methodological individualist assumptions of North’s 
Limited Access Order framework. This means that it can be used to understand the historically 
variable relationship between violence and power as well as the geopolitical contexts of conflict that 
are excluded from conventional new institutional approaches.43 Ideas and ideologies have come to 
play a role in political settlements research in terms of understanding legitimization and 
mobilization.44 Hickey and Izama demonstrate how the interplay between ideas and interests within 
the political settlement in Uganda influence the governance of the oil sector. Work on how ideas 
matter in political settlements is evolving but it is not always clear why it may be more important to 
study ideology in some cases than in others. For example, Hickey and Izama’s work in Uganda 
argues that ideology was an important determinant in the evolution of policymaking, while Abdulai 
and Hickey’s work on Ghana demonstrates that it was less important in the education sector.45 Part 
of the issue here is that there is no clear consensus on how to define ideas or ideology within a 
political settlements approach.46  One option could be to view ideology as ‘a neutral set of beliefs’ 
while another is to take a more Marxian stance and see it is an ‘inversion of reality’ where 
economic actors, capitalists and the government use narratives to obfuscate the exploitation 
associated with accumulation strategies.47   
There are examples of studies that use the latter approach.48 Lars Buur and Padil Salimo argue that 
ideas and interests can be intertwined in practice.49 The ruling Mozambique Liberation Front 
(Frelimo)  elite could, for example, see the benefits in agreeing to donor-driven social protection 
measures, as this helped it solve other problems related to poverty reduction and the continuation of 
                                                          
41 Christopher Cramer, Unemployment and participation in violence (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2010).  
42 Christopher Cramer, Civil war is not a stupid thing: Accounting for violence in developing countries (Hurst, London, 
2006). 
43 Gray, ‘Access orders’. 
44 Hickey, ’Thinking about the politics’; Behuria, ‘Countering threats’. 
45 Abdulai and Hickey, ‘The politics of development’; Hickey and Izama, ‘The politics of governing oil’. 
46 Hudson and Leftwich, ‘From political economy’; Hickey, ‘Thinking about the politics’; Tom Lavers and Sam 
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fuel subsidies, helping it calm riots and societal unrest. Similarly, the adoption of the World Bank-
driven and financed work for social transfers, which the government had avoided until the 2010 
riots, was adopted relatively smoothly when it was seen as helping maintain foundational ideas like 
national unity organized in and around the continued dominance of the Frelimo party.   
Historical studies of political parties can demonstrate how existing ruling coalitions legitimize their 
rule and how they use external and internal threats to build elite cohesion and popular support. 
Elites develop narratives to legitimize their actions. For example, in many African countries, the 
transition from one-party states to military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s, and the passage from 
military to democratic regimes in the 1980s, occurred ‘in the name of the fight against corruption.’50 
Once the power of ruling elites is contested, decisions to exclude or eliminate other elites or rivals 
are also accompanied by legitimating such actions on the basis of values or defiance of rules. 
Opposing narratives can often highlight the terms of ideological contestation between rival groups.  
Furthermore, ideologies have implications for patterns of accumulation and therefore for how the 
distribution of power changes over time. Gray explores how the political commitment to creating 
socialism in the 1960s and 1970s in Tanzania and Vietnam affected the distribution of power in 
society through policies that constrained the economic power of capitalists while forging new 
collective economic institutions. Ultimately the productive transformation that was needed to make 
these institutions viable did not take place, but the ‘socialist political settlement’ provides an 
interesting juxtaposition to the distribution of power in other African countries that were guided by 
other political ideologies and commitments.51  
Violence is another important source of holding power in societies. Antonio Giustozzi argues that 
controlling the monopoly of violence occurs through two very different processes. The first is the 
primitive accumulation of coercive power, which is characterised by war or untamed, indiscriminate 
violence.52 Such violence characterises the initial establishment of the monopoly. The second 
process is the consolidation of the monopoly of large-scale violence, which is threatened at various 
stages by rivals within and outside the ruling elite. Studying the changes in the allocation of 
violence rights in societies necessitates a study of the evolution of power and authority within 
national security services since threat often requires an alliance with factions within those groups.  
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Giustozzi argues that studying the historical evolution of power within security services in late 
developing countries is essential to understand how the allocation of violence rights changes over 
time. Of course, many militaries in developing and developed countries are also involved in 
business.53  Just take the recent debt crisis in Mozambique as an example where the ruling political 
elite together with the intelligence and security apparatus took secret loans to finance a low 
intensity civil war with the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), Frelimo’s old foe.54 
Though that may imply that the accumulation of violence rights often goes hand-in-hand with the 
accumulation of wealth, it is not always the case. In fact, military actors often contest the actions of 
governments even if some individuals are offered rents, and at times, exclusion from violence rights 
can itself be a motive for conflict.  
Studies using political settlements theory tend to focus on how groups, including ethnic groups in 
some contexts, currently distribute rents or political power in terms of official positions in the 
military, government or business. However, to study the ‘historically rooted capacities of different 
groups’,55 it is essential to highlight that many individuals who have holding power do not hold 
formal positions of power.  Those who lose their official positions may lose some degree of power 
and are excluded from the dominant coalition. However, they often retain power to challenge 
existing authorities. Many individuals who retain holding power may never hold any official 
positions.  
 
Situating political settlements in the field of political economy of Africa  
The political settlements approach shares a preoccupation with power and institutions with a range 
of other approaches within the field of political economy. In particular, political settlements 
research tends to focus on the phenomena of political clientelism, the use of state resources to 
maintain and create state legitimacy, informal processes of capitalist accumulation and political 
violence. These features of the contemporary political landscape are not exclusive to African 
countries. However, these phenomenon have been framed in very specific ways in much of the 
research on African countries that draw from neo-Weberian ideas of neopatrimonialism. A political 
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settlements approach differs from the neopatrimonial literature on clientelism in very important 
ways, in particular in understanding the causes and consequences as well as questioning the 
exceptionalism given to the phenomenon within research on African political economy. The 
neopatrimonial approaches have a long intellectual history within the study of Africa. Aristide 
Zolberg and Jean-Francois Medard represent the older school on neopatrimonialism and they 
emphasize the variability of patrimonial forms and link neopatrimonialism to capitalist 
transformation, demonstrating how incomplete such analysis turned out to be for Africa.56 In the 
newer forms of neopatrimonialism approaches,57 the drivers of neopatrimonialism are located in 
social relations and in a set of assumptions about the pre-modern basis of authority on which 
African states are constructed. The arbitrariness of patrimonialism was seen to stifle capitalism by 
lowering investment and preventing long-term planning by capitalists, as well as encouraging 
patrimonial leaders to arbitrarily favour their clients. The main problem with the neopatrimonial 
school, from a political settlements perspective, is that it does not provide a way of understanding 
how such political practices vary across the continent or across time and how forms of clientelist 
politics interact with other forms of political mobilization. 
The political settlements approach instead starts from an attempt to understand the variations in the 
distribution of power across countries. Such variations produce diverse effects on the process of 
capitalist transformation, which has turned out to be remarkably uneven in African countries. This 
is in contrast to some who characterize clientelism as a uniquely African experience or a uniform 
characteristic of politics across African countries.58 Scholarship that has emphasized 
‘developmental patrimonialism’ – arguing that rents derived as outcomes of clientelism can be used 
in productive ways – continue to emphasise a ‘modal pattern’ of rent-seeking in relation to 
economic development.59 Instead, a political settlements approach emphasizes the diversity among 
African countries in the distribution of power in society.60 The drivers of clientelism in a political 
settlements approach emerge from specific colonial histories and contemporary economic structures 
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that lead to particular distributions of power outside the formal institutions of the state. Thus, a 
political settlements analysis can provide a way of understanding the sources of political 
contestation and why it is very difficult to consolidate programmatic politics at particular moments 
in a country’s history.61  
A second issue regarding the neopatrimonial tradition is related to the unit of analysis. 
Neopatrimonial approaches draw on Weberian methodological individualism where rulers exercised 
patrimonial domination, which became supported with the help of the state bureaucracy in 
independent African states, and administrative staff chosen usually from ethnically faithful and 
dependent followers. This contrasts sharply with the structural perspective of the political 
settlements approach, which combines structural factors with individual choices and understands 
that individual choices are shaped by the distribution of power in society.  
The basic assumptions related to capitalist transformation and individual/personal power posed by 
the neopatrimonial approach are shared by NIE approaches to power. While neopatrimonialism and 
NIE approaches differ in terms of some of their key conceptual building blocks, they nonetheless 
share a number of assumptions about the role of clientelism in economic change that differs from 
political settlements approach. In particular, they both assert the argument that poor economic 
performance is linked to the prevalence of neopatrimonial politics in African countries. In contrast, 
the political settlements framework demonstrates how clientelism and accumulation work together 
to create different paths of economic change.  
The NIE framework of Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson starts from the idea 
of studying de facto power relations and de jure institutions by examining struggles over the 
distribution of resources.62 However, in their framework, formal institutions must ultimately 
conform to the distribution of de facto power and political struggle will occur between elites until 
formal institutions are in alignment with power relations. As argued earlier, a political settlements 
approach can explain why the distribution of power can reside outside institutions without 
reshaping formal institutions. Thus a political settlements analysis involves documenting the power 
struggles over flows of resources between groups rather than the institutional outcomes of such 
conflict. 
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Another important contrast is that Acemoglu and Robinson’s framework starts off from an analysis 
of elites as the most important group in society.63 This approach stems from the work of Mancur 
Olson who argues that elites are the most important social actors as they have superior organizing 
skills and therefore have a privileged position in mobilizing collective action.64 Related to this 
focus, some of the donor-funded research programmes that take up the political settlements 
approach (the Developmental Leadership Programme and the African Politics and Power 
Programme) have linked the distribution of power to an analysis of elite bargains. This has 
contributed to the misunderstanding political settlements approaches focus solely or primarily on 
elite power.   
In a political settlements approach, the distribution of power cannot simply be read off from a study 
of elite politics, but starts from a much broader mapping of the groups that hold power in society,65 
including both elite and non-elite groups. The class-theoretic roots of the political settlements 
framework are much more apparent in the earlier work on political settlements, which focused on 
the role of intermediate class groups (a term that originates in the work of Michal Kalecki on 
India)66 rather than elites as the key political organizers within multi-class clientelist networks.67  
In terms of understanding the drivers of economic change, the political settlements approach 
involves studying the way that specific groups gain security and how specific incentives for 
learning are imposed either by the state or through pressures and relationships between different 
groups in the private sector. This is more open than for mainstream institutional theory, in which 
political order that protects private property and promotes competition is argued to be a necessary 
pre-condition for explaining sustained economic change and development. For example, in East 
Africa while Asian industrialists were marginalized from formal politics, many were able to protect 
their property rights due to informal relations involving financial support to ruling parties. While 
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this facilitated certain forms of investment in the domestic economy, it also made industrial policy 
more difficult to implement as open transfers to support industry were politically untenable.68  
This leads us to a final issue concerning the status of the political settlements theoretical approach. 
Does the political settlements approach allow for prediction in the mold of NIE and mainstream 
political science approaches? Khan’s much referenced political settlements typology of patron-
client factions and the structure of the ruling coalition involves four ideal types: Potential 
Development Coalitions, (vulnerable) Authoritarian Coalitions, (weak) Dominant Coalitions and 
Competitive Clientelism.69 These ideal types are often employed as if one can actually predict 
certain outcomes depending on how a particular settlement is classified. We suggest this is deeply 
misleading. In recent work, Buur, Whitfield and others show that countries with similarities in the 
structure of the ruling coalition can have very different outcomes for the implementation of 
industrial policies within the same overall institutional context.70 We would instead argue that the 
real value of Khan’s ideal types is not the ability to predict, but that the approach, as a set of 
theorized mid-range contentions, is a good basis for construing informed hypotheses. Further 
elaboration on Khan’s typologies can be excellent theoretical tools for constructing hypotheses 
pointing at the three basic levels of analysis related to the vertical distribution of power, the 
horizontal distribution of power, and how a given political settlement is financed.  
This is important because a given political settlement is in constant processes of change, but can be 
analyzed over a concrete time-period. A political settlement is a high-level description of the 
distribution of power and institutions in a country, but the same analysis can be applied to particular 
regions or sectors. While there might be distinct features of the political settlement at different 
levels within the state or within different organizations or regions, an understanding of the 
overarching political settlement is needed to understand the local importance of particular features 
of institutions and distributions of power. While questions of power and institutions are relevant 
across a whole range of social phenomena, a political settlements analysis provides unique insights 
into questions related to economic and political change. This is because it places these processes 
specifically within the context of global capitalism, and therefore avoids narrow methodological 
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nationalism, while allowing for a much richer understanding of the economy that draws from 
heterodox theories of economic change. 
 
Conclusion 
This Research Note has presented our understanding of the political settlements approach and has 
argued that it offers a distinctive and valuable addition to the political economy tools of analysis for 
African countries. The political settlements approach provides an alternative framework to NIE and 
Weberian neopatrimonial theories. It allows for a more open understanding of the relationship 
between political order and economic change, where economic change is explained as resulting 
from accumulation and incentives that can be shaped in different ways by ideas, formal and 
informal institutions and the distribution of power.  
Determining the distribution of holding power in a society requires combining an understanding of 
economic structure and how rents are distributed between different groups with an examination of 
other factors including ideology and the appropriation of violence rights. To develop studies of 
political settlements in particular countries, a historical study of the evolution of holding power 
arrangements should be complemented with an examination of political ruptures and the 
contestation that occurs during such moments. Advancing political settlements research could also 
encompass fine-grained historical and ethnographic work to understand the informal relations 
between the state and firms that underpin particular political settlements in African countries. This 
demands in-depth historical knowledge and theoretical understanding that spans a range of different 
disciplines, which is challenging but rewarding.   
 
 
